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I. Punishment: From Welfare Instrumentalism to Moral Expressivism
When Andrew von Hirsch's conception of punishment as censure was published, quickly getting considerable attention, this was at the peak of a criminal law politics which considered punishment as an instrument for the realisation of political goals.
The most important goal was, of course, prevention of crime. Preventive criminal law politics was part of the welfare state reform agenda of most of the wealthier countries in the Western World during the Cold War period.
1 It conceived of law as a form of political instrumentalism, wherein punishment was an integral part. Embedded in a broader policy of societal reform, which included measures designed to change economic inequality and to improve the situation of the poor by redistribution of wealth and public support, one of its primary goals was the rehabilitation of the offender and the prevention of offending. Punishment could only be justified as a means to an end, i.e., an end which was politically justified by the public good of increasing the welfare of society.
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The articulation of punishment as censure was intended and widely regarded as part of a general critique of political criminal law instrumentalism, in particular of simpleminded or purely symbolic measures of crime prevention. This critique is founded primarily on moral reasons and assumes a moral conception of criminal law. One of its central objections is that political instrumentalism disregards the status of the perpetrator as an (autonomous) moral person and treats him or her as a mere object of preventive intervention-as an object of rehabilitative treatment or police intervention, or as a tool for public security measures via punishment; and in general as a means for the realisation of political ends in criminal law legislation. -Although ⃰ I am very grateful to Andrew Simester for his valuable comments and editorial help. Thanks to Rebecca Schmidt for her help and encouragement. All remaining mistakes and ambiguities are mine. 1 D Garland and RA Duff, 'Preface: A. von Hirsch, Censure and Proportionality' in RA Duff and D political criminal law instrumentalism had its merits, notably for abrogating oldfashioned and unjustifiable prohibitions in the realm of offences against public morality, it was at the same time very expansive. There seemed to be no limit to criminalising any behaviour that was regarded as somehow dangerous and socially dysfunctional; no reference to essential moral values, to a moral relationship between victim and offender, and to the offender as a moral agent. Why should, e.g., insider trading on the financial market be declared a crime (as it was done in Germany 1994), when it serves only a collective good like the efficiency of the stock market, and when there is no real victim in a moral relationship to an offender? As a consequence, a political conception and justification of criminal law is either rejected or modified into a conception of political morality. It is rejected to the extent that it is equated with an instrumentalist view of the political in general.
Doing justice instead of pursuing political goals with punishment implies that crime is primarily considered as a moral interaction between moral and autonomous persons:
the offender as a responsible subject, and the victim as a moral subject whose autonomy and integrity is denied by the offender. And it involves a third party, society: not as a collective agent whose public welfare should be served by punishment but, again, as moral agents who get a moral message by the punishment of the offender, 'providing them with reason for desistence.' 3 Furthermore, punishment has to be a proportionate reaction ('just desert') which expresses moral condemnation to the degree of 'the blameworthiness of the conduct', instead of a reaction which is chosen for instrumentalist reasons as a means to realise the political goal of prevention. 4 Its expressive function is central, because it detaches punishment from any further political purpose which should be realised. As an expression, or manifestation, of moral condemnation of the offender as a responsible agent, at the same time addressed to the victim as a moral person who was wronged by the fault of the offender, and as an expression of moral indignation about and a moral disapproval of the crime by third parties or society, punishment can stand on its own feet and does not need any further political justification. 
II. The Communicative Turn
The shift from political instrumentalism to moral expressivism of punishment has of course to do with a general critique of welfare state political instrumentalism which was raised for many different reasons. Although welfare state politics was inaugurated for the benefit of society, for the realisation of social equality and justice, and directed by democratic legislation, there was a strong tendency to treat citizens more as an object of intervention than as subjects or participants. Consequently, experts played an important role on all levels from legislation to individual cases, and society in general was envisaged as an entity of regulation, steering, and control by the state and the political system. At the end of the Cold War period, the experience of self-empowerment of the civil society came more and more to be regarded as an important resource of social integration. Civil rights movements were one part of this experience of civil solidarity; the struggle of minorities of different kinds for recognition of their identity, and for equal concern and respect in a pluralistic society, another one. 5 As a consequence, citizens discovered the empowering dimension of their rights, actively participating in the self-organisation of society on different levels and in different areas. Demanding reasons and justifications in a fair procedure with equal participation became an end in itself, thus transforming the top-down-structure of welfare state politics. Participation could be demanded and organised by increasing communication, among the members of civil society as well as between the state and the citizens. Indeed, social integration can only be realised through communication, wherein the citizen is regarded and treated as a moral person, taking responsibility for himself; this could be achieved by treating him as a communicative actor.
With regard to punishment, the communicative turn of modern societies was naturally ambivalent. On the one hand, it lead to a re-discovery of the offender as a communicative agent, as a person who had to respond to and had to be treated as responsible for the crime he or she committed. The crime has to be censured, the observer's point of view when the offender obviously lacks the capability of responsibility. On the other hand, the communicative turn also led to a re-discovery of the victim of crime as a moral person with his or her own needs and interests which should be recognised by the reaction to crime. If preventive justice ignored the moral personhood of the offender, it did the same with the victim, who was more or less neutralised and excluded from the public justification of preventive punishment.
Recognising the offender as a communicative actor went hand in hand with recognition of the victim as a communicative actor in the penal justice system.
According to David Garland, the public rehabilitation of the victim was one of the strongest motives for a critique of welfare state criminal law instrumentalism.
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Taking the communicative turn into account, treating offender and victim as moral persons implied treating them as communicative actors who are able and have an obligation to respond, who have a right to ask for justifications, and an obligation to give answers. Consequently, punishment had to change its identity. It turned from being a political measure, from being a means to an end, into a moral message, an expression of censure; which must be conveyed to the offender, to the victim, and to society. 
III. Punishment as Communication
Most studies of punishment as communication start with the communicative meaning of punishment. As mentioned above, punishment addresses the offender as a responsible agent; likewise the victim and the other members of the community.
Punishment conveys a message to them too. But it is always part of any standard explanation of punishment that it is also, and perhaps primarily, a response to a crime. As an 'answer', it not only addresses the offender, the victim and the community, but it does so because of the crime committed by the offender. This is true independently of any goal or message which is attributed to hard treatment.
Even preventive theories of punishment do not deny the fact that a crime was committed as a necessary condition for preventive punishment.
But how do communicative theories of punishment refer to the crime? Is it only the cause, the occasion, for conveying the message of censure to the offender and to other persons? It must be more. The concept of a censure which addresses the offender as a responsible agent, sensitive to reasons and capable of deliberation, being convinced by normative reasons that his behaviour was wrong, is also committed to the view that what the offender did has a communicative meaning too.
To treat the offender and the community as rational and communicative agents who are responsible for their actions, who can respond to censure, leads necessarily to the conclusion that the crime itself, insofar as it was committed by a rational and communicative agent, has a communicative meaning too. severe deficits and therefore has to be detained; or when the crime is considered' as an effect of a cause which can be empirically studied and remedied, say as a problem of social regulation, of means-end interventions designed to neutralise the cause. But these examples of a communication about the crime and the offender have no internal relationship to punishment. They lead only to interventions according to observations and scientific hypothesises about cause-effect-relations. If punishment is to have any communicative meaning, it must be conceived of as a part of a communicative relationship with the offender-that is, as a communicative response to an offender because of her crime.
IV. What does the Crime Say?
Therefore one should conceive of punishment-as-communication as part of a communicative sequence which already starts with the crime. As a communicative action, punishment says something, because of a crime, to somebody. As an answer, there has to be something prior to which it is a response. Crime and punishment stand in a communicative relationship. It is the meaning of the crime to which the meaning of punishment is related. One can think of crime and punishment as speech acts which refer to each other.
But what could be the meaning of the crime to which punishment is the answer?
Obviously, it must be more than the meaning of the volitional action which is labelled a crime. One might draw an analogy with a simple version of a theory of meaning, according to which the meaning of a sentence is the intention of the speaker.
Analogously, the meaning of a crime could be the purpose of the offender, for example the end which an actor wants to realise by moving his body in a certain way, the reason he would give when asked why he did it. But considered as an intentional action only, the movements of the body are neutral towards the question whether the action is a crime or not. If A intentionally kills B, A might pursue some end with the action (e.g., getting money), but it is not inherent in that description whether A's action is a crime. As a crime, an action contains an additional meaning; or at least, an additional meaning is attributed to it. As a crime, it is a violation of a norm of criminal law, a violation of legally protected interests or goods, a harm to others which is legally prohibited. Usually, this is not the meaning which was attributed to the action by the offender himself, except in rare cases where the offender aims at the violation of the law intentione recta, like civil disobedience (with the additional aim to defend the law in general and to protest against what she considers to be a violation of the law by the political system), or like offenders who act as terrorists. If so, the problem is that such an additional meaning cannot simply be attributed to the offender. 12 The typical crime of theft or killing is not done with the intention of committing a crime;
rather, that status is attributed to the offender's action by the victim and by society.
One can find conceptions of a crime as communicative action among retributivist theories, including perhaps Kant and Hegel. Although neither of them elaborated on a communicative theory of punishment in the strict sense, they conceptualised crime and punishment as a sequence which is structured by a meaning beyond the intention of the offender. For both, the crime is self-negating because of its meaning: pronounce a rule according to which theft were permitted. It is already sufficient that the offender makes an assertion, performs a speech act, which claims to be recognised as valid-as any other assertion or imperative which claims to be true or morally right. As an assertion which raises a validity claim, it has to be taken seriously: it has to be regarded as a communicative act which is addressed to others with the claim to be based on reasons and the responsibility to commitments which are inferentially entailed in the statement. Hegel links the validity of the implicit statement inherent in the criminal act to its 'subjective imputation' to the will of the offender: 'that the crime is committed without any hesitation … that it shall be valid'; re-affirmed so that the citizens can continue to rely on that norm when planning their lives.
If one takes together Kant's, Hegel's and Jakobs' interpretation of the message which is conveyed by the crime, it turns out that the argument of self-destruction of the implicitly proposed norm, and the self-contradiction of the offender who wants to get the advantages of a law which she denies by her crime, works only because the legitimacy of a general normative order is already somehow presupposed. The offender, as well as the victim and society as a whole, inhabit a normative order which is already accepted and intelligible for everyone. But if that's right, the message of the crime can be denied without any real communication. Either punishment takes place within the offender because of her self-contradiction-it simply executes the internal communication of the offender with herself about the contradiction of the two norms she wants to propose at once-or it takes place within the society which re-affirms the validity of its normative order and re-integrates its members into it by punishing the offender. Here, society communicates with itself, and the offender is only confronted with the law. 23 The law doesn't speak. Yet, if one takes crime and punishment as communication seriously, one has to include the law in the communicative sequence and look more closely at its communicative role within this sequence.
V. What does the Criminal Law Say?
As the explanation of the communicative meaning of punishment by Kant, Hegel, and Jakobs has demonstrated, we have to start the communicative sequence not just with the crime, but already with the criminal law prohibiting a certain human conduct and defining it as a crime. But why and how, and to whom does the criminal law speak? And how is its message related to the message conveyed by punishment?
According to Kant and Hegel, the law does not speak, because it is already and obviously present as the reasonable and general will. According to Jakobs, it does not speak because it is already there as the normative structure of a functionally differentiated society. By contrast, Antony Duff has made the important point that the 23 A similar objection against 'norm-oriented' communicative theories of punishment is made by 
VI. Why Hard Treatment?
If the communicative circle of criminal law, crime and punishment is complete, the obvious question arises why the other element of punishment, hard treatment, is necessary. If the communicative meaning of punishment can be made completely explicit by the communicative circle, why is it necessary to add more, to put the offender in jail or to take her money? What could hard treatment do what cannot be done by the explicit performance of the communicative action? As Duff asks:
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But censure can be expressed by a formal conviction, or by a purely symbolic punishment that burdens the offender only insofar as it takes its message of censure seriously. Why then should we express it through the kinds of hard treatment punishment that our existing penal system impose-punishments that are burdensome or painful independently of their communicative content?
One can distinguish two different answers to this question. The first admits that the meaning of punishment can be made fully explicit and performed by communicative action, and that hard treatment is-at best-a different kind of reaction to the crime and the offender which is independent of the communicative meaning and pursues a different purpose, e.g. deterrence. 30 The second answer claims that the meaning of punishment cannot be made completely explicit without hard treatment, that the performance of the communicative action is incomplete without some extra-linguistic behaviour.
This second, constitutive line of thinking is found in writers such as Jakobs, for whom the communication of the norm's validity through punishment is in need of a 'cognitive safeguard of the norm's validity'. 31 Similarly, Duff has suggested that the communication of censure has to be followed by a 'purposive communication' with the offender who takes a burden upon herself, by which she can make explicit that she understands the communicative message-like a procedure of mediation between victim and offender or different kinds of community services.
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Hörnle also claims that the communication of censure is in need of a 'symbolic substantiation' by hard treatment, because otherwise there would be no quantifying scale to make differences which are proportionate to the degree of injustice. 
VII. Communication as an Action
It is quite surprising that most authors who emphasise the communicative meaning of punishment do not consider communication as a kind of action in itself, as something which can stand on its own feet as an action. Typically, either hard treatment is considered as a medium for the transfer of punishment's propositional content-the moral message of censure-or, if hard treatment and the moral message are separated, the pure expression of the message is considered to be something deficient, something which lacks an important element. On the latter view, without hard treatment the pure expression would come down to a simple utterance of words which were not taken seriously, not by the victim, not by society, and primarily not by the offender. This is even true for expressive theories like von Hirsch's, according to which hard treatment can be justified by deterrence, as an addition to the separately justified censure. But is either view really true? What if expressing the moral message of censure were already a kind of action in itself, and as such, itself a treatment of the offender, and if it were already embedded in a communicative relationship among offender, victim and society which can be made explicit?
One possible interpretation of communication as an action is provided by speech act theory. 34 As John Searle has stated his central hypothesis, 'speaking a language is engaging in a rule-governed form of behaviour. To put it more briskly, talking is performing acts according to rules. In order to elaborate more on the distinctive communicative aspect of punishment, it may be helpful to take some insights from speech act theories. 36 According to these theories, communicative action can be analysed on three levels. This constitutive effect of the illocutionary act of promising is independent of all those additional effects which can also be caused in the social world by the commitment. If the hearer-or third parties-understand the speaker's utterance correctly as a promise, this might generate certain additional effects like emotions of delight, trust, or a motive for other actions of the hearer. These effects-perlocutionary effectsmay well be intended by the speaker too, but they are incidental and not inherent in the illocutionary force. A speaker can have various purposes for making a promise, but these (ulterior) purposes are not relevant to the question whether the locutionary act itself is (or is not) a promise qua illocutionary act.
In cases such as promising, the illocutionary force of speech acts may depend on the existence of extra-linguistic rules. The utterance of the word 'yes!' as an answer to the celebrant's question whether one would marry one's partner may count toward a valid marriage only when a system of rules about the legal institution of marriage already exists, and when it is intersubjectively recognised by the collective intention of the members of the group. A marriage is an institutional social fact which is constituted by rules; as an institution it consists of a 'system of constitutive rules'.
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Institutional facts can be generated by declarative speech acts; with them a speaker 37 For example, the locutionary act of of saying, 'there's a man behind you with a gun' might have the illocutionary force of a warning not to move, and the perlocutionary effect of making the addressee turn around. what he said and, on the other side, the hearer is obliged to give reasons for her dissent. In this way an acceptance or consensus can be established between speaker and hearer, emerging from a rational discourse between them. The discourse is itself a sequence of communicative interaction, and the consensus generates further binding effects for speaker and hearer because of its possible inferences and commitments.
One could therefore say that a speaker raises a claim by performing a speech act sincerely, a claim which is directed to its acceptance by reasons. The kinds of reasons which are given and demanded by the participants in a discourse depend, in turn, on the nature of any ensuing disagreement. Habermas distinguishes three different issues of disagreement: the truth of the propositional content, as well as of the implicit and presupposed assertions regarding contextual facts of the speech act;
the correctness of the explicit or contextual normative content of the speech act; and the sincerity and authenticity of the speaker's performance of the speech act. Thus, what the speaker claims with her performance of the illocutionary act is that its assertive component is true, that its normative component is correct, and that its subjective component is sincere. These validity claims are challenged and confirmed through reasoning, by the speaker, the hearer and-because they are reasondependent and to that extent general-by any third party. By raising such validity claims with the illocutionary component of her speech act, the speaker is obliged to justify its truth, correctness, and sincerity, should her claim be challenged by the hearer or anybody else.
If one takes this extended interpretation of the illocutionary meaning into account, it becomes obvious that, whether or not it happens to contain performative elements of the kind Hamel envisages, communicative action is always embedded in an intersubjective context which has a normative structure. The normative structure is made explicit in the case of contestation, when a validity claim is rejected and reasons are demanded by hearer and speaker. Reasons and justifications are always in the background when a speech act is performed sincerely. An important part of this normative structure is that speaker and hearer are obliged to treat each other as persons who have a right to disagree, to demand reasons; and an obligation to give reasons. This normative and social relationship is constituted by the illocutionary force of the speech act.
VIII. Again: Punishment as Communication
This interpretation allows for a new approach to the communicative meaning of punishment, one that does not depend so much on the classification of censure as a declarative. The important point is that censure as a speech act raises a validity claim which refers to a valid normative order whose legitimacy can be justified by reasons in a rational discourse. It refers to the normative order, the system of legal norms, to the victim, and to the offender.
From this point of view, it can be seen that the crime as well as the response to it must be understood in a communicative fashion. In a democratic and republican setting, where legal norms are legitimised in a public and inclusive process of deliberation and contestation, citizens are primarily regarded and regard themselves as communicative actors. Such a setting institutionalises the normative structure of the intersubjective relationship between speaker and hearer with regard to law and politics. Citizens are regarded, treated and understand themselves as rational beings who raise claims, who give and receive reasons, who interpret their actions as meaningful and self-authored, and who are able to take reasons into account when planning and performing an action. This is the reason why they can be considered as co-legislators, and it grounds the public meaning of crime. And this is the reason why Hegel could claim that, by committing a crime, the offender proposes a new norm. It rests on the concept of a responsible agent: 'Democratic law needed to rest on beliefs in the civil qualities of actors; it is centred, in fact, on motives, on cultural assumptions about agency, understanding, and responsibility.' 41 Furthermore, it is not the act of punishing itself which somehow introduces a new meaning or a message, one that could be made independently explicit, translated and pronounced. The criminal procedure is already a communicative process. And its end, the verdict, is an essentially communicative act. 42 It fulfils the requirements of a communicatively integrated society: it is public and reasoned. Of course, the verdict is institutionally related to hard treatment-and hard treatment gets its meaning through an interpretation which refers to the verdict. But this relationship does not 41 Alexander, The Civil Sphere, above n 5 at 178. 42 S Schork, Ausgesprochen schuldig-Dogmatische und metadogmatische Untersuchungen zum Schuldspruch (Frankfurt, Peter Lang, 2005) .
mean that both have to be necessarily considered and treated as a unity. They have to be treated separately.
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With regard to the offender, the communicative message is twofold. As has been suggested by von Hirsch and others who propose a communicative interpretation of punishment, one part of the meaning conveyed to the offender is that what he did is wrong. But the pure statement of wrongfulness is not enough. The norm is not presented to the offender as something that he has to take for granted. Because the verdict is, as a speech act, performed in an intersubjective relationship with a normative structure based on reasons and justifications, the claim of the verdict that the crime is wrong can be justified by reasons. Furthermore, in a democratic society, one can interpret the violation of the norm itself as a normative statement, an expression of dissent against the valid norm.
But here is the crux. The offender's expression of dissent was not articulated through the public deliberative procedures of the public sphere of civil society, even though he had a right-in that forum-to propose an abrogation of the valid norm. As a statement of dissent, the offender's norm-violating act is legitimately rejected as wrong. He did not address the other citizen-the victim-as a communicative actor, as an equal participant in the public discourse, but denied his status. Consequently, the offender is not regarded as a co-legislator. He has to bear the burden of being forced into a legal procedure which treats him as a person, a responsible agent, but only with regard to his role as an addressee of the norm, not as its co-author.
